Introduction
Ordinarily, when teenagers are inclined to undertake dangerous or risky activities, the opposition comes from their parents. As a result, debates about the decision-making authority of teenagers collapse into debates over parental authority. But when parents have no objection to their teenagers' risky behavior, the issue of teenagers' decisionmaking authority comes more sharply into focus, raising fundamental questions about the nature of autonomy and the grounds for treating children differently from adults. theories treat the person's age itself as decisive (be it 12 or 16 or 21), such that all children of a certain age will be subjected to the same rule. This provides a practicable and clear criterion but also seems to do injustice to competent or precocious minors by denying them authoritative decision-making status on the basis of morally irrelevant considerations. By contrast, 'competence-based theories' treat authoritative status as accorded on the basis of each individual's actual decisionmaking competence or proficiency. The courts in the Dekker case did not decide the matter by a fixed age limit (as most states do in determining a well-specified set of often-recurring risks like drinking and driving), nor did it tie Dekker's fate to the average competencies of people of her own age. Rather, Dekker's actual technical competencies were taken to be decisive. In taking this line, the courts adopted a competence-based view, while many opponents in public debate took an age-based view. In this section we hope to show that both age-based and competence-based theories are morally problematic.
The problem with age-based theories is that they seem to rely on ageist discrimination against children. Our current legal systems at many points rely on systematic restrictions on the individual liberty and political representation of a large segment of the population, simply on the basis of age. This clearly requires a convincing argument for why this ought to be decided on the basis of how many years one has been alive. It's not, of course, that age per se is morally relevant. Age-based theories are characterized by their use of age as a proxy measure for morally relevant factors that often coincide with youth, such as inexperience, impulsivity, or ignorance. 9 This linkage is what critics of age-based criteria for decision-making authority do not accept. Empirically, cases of precocious children demonstrate how unreliable age can be as a proxy. And as a matter of principle, respect for the equal dignity of persons as individuals would seem to require that they not be lumped together on the basis of a morally irrelevant criterion, but rather that the treatment be tied directly on the individual's possession of the requisite proficiency or competence in the domain in question.
10 9 Cf. in a different context (Boxill 1992, 9-18) . 10 This position is taken by child-liberation authors such as (Farson 1974) and (Holt 1974) , and is the target of the use of 'proficiency' in Tamar Schapiro's challenge to an understanding of adult in terms of what she call "proficiency" (which we introduce in the next section). Note that a child-liberationist need not be opposed age-based criteria and may simply be opposed to the current age of majority being too high.
This seems to suggest that competence-based views are superior. But they encounter a powerful set of objections regarding what this would actually mean in (legal) practice. As Feinberg puts the point, "the law cannot do without rigid lines dividing 'standard persons,' who because of their age are presumed to have sufficient capacity to play some given legal role, from those below that age who are not. That is because direct tests of capacity in particular cases without recourse to such rules would be cumbersome to administer, or unreliable, or both" (Feinberg 1986, 326) .
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Moreover, there is a troubling potential for bias in such competence-assessments.
Determining how old someone is ordinarily a value-free and reliable affair. Processes of determining whether someone is 'sufficiently competent,' by contrast, are ordinarily value-laden, highly contested, and riddled with problems of reliability -all of which opens the door to systematic biases.
In some cases, of course, procedures of competence-assessment are rather well established, such as getting a driver's license. But matters quickly become much more controversial once we have to assess things like Dekker's psychological preparedness to make her solo voyage. In part, this is a matter of potential for bias and abuse, that is, of vague criteria being interpreted in ways that go against the interests of the agents themselves. In addition, competence-criteria turn out not to be neutral between different ways of leading a life, each way having its own different prerequisites. For example, does Dekker's cool affect and emotional distance from peers mean that she is at psychological risk or does it rather mean that she is especially well suited for a solo journey around the world? Trying to answer that question quickly draws one into substantive issues of how she can best lead her life, issues that governments and courts are rightly keen to avoid whenever possible.
Up to this point there seems to be a an irresolvable dilemma between ageist discrimination against children, on the one hand, and the risks of unworkable and controversial competence tests, on the other (Schrag 1977, 336) . Even so, defenders of age-neutral, competence-based approaches might still claim to have the moral high ground. After all, they will say, the difficulties and even political risks involved in administering tests for psychological maturity or decision-making competence pale in comparison to the moral violation involved in systematic discrimination on the basis of a morally irrelevant criterion of age. If the choice is between pragmatism and morality, the advocates of pragmatism seem to be on shaky grounds, especially when they are adults defending an automatic privilege. This is too quick, however, for it overlooks the fact that there is a more principled objection to a competence-based approach. For, if age-neutrality is the principle, then that is a principle that cuts two ways. Competence is competence, and so it would not only be those under the age of 18 who would have to demonstrate that they make the grade for decision-making authority. Thus, 40-year-olds who fail to meet the standards would, on this approach, fall into the same category with incompetent 12-year-olds.
But is it really a good idea to start assessing the emotional maturity and relationship-skills of adults in determining whether they should be allowed to sail solo around the world? The unpalatable results of an age-neutral approach is that it opens the door to rampant paternalism towards adults. Defenders of age-neutrality could, of course, bite the bullet here, candidly welcoming an expanded scope for intervening in the lives of immature and incompetent individuals above the age of 18, especially those who take more irrational risks than many 14-year-olds.
At this point, however, it becomes clear that age-neutral, competence-based criteria for adulthood sit very uneasily with the fundamental liberal principle that adult persons have a special authority over their own self-regarding choices, including what others deem 'bad' decisions. If the liberal distinction between harm to others (bases for interference) and harm to self (no bases for interference) is to have any bite, then at least some class of persons needs to have the possibility of actually harming themselves. The paradoxical thing about this class of persons, normally called 'adults,' is that they all have a 'right of autonomy' to an equal degree, even though they may differ markedly in the degree to which they have developed the skills, character, and capacities characteristic of fully autonomous persons. In other words, it is a core commitment of liberalism that, although autonomy, in one sense, develops over time and admits of gradations, in another sense it marks a threshold whereby everybody above that threshold has decision-making authority and 'rights of autonomy,' such that further differences in autonomy are of no moral significance (Feinberg 1986 It might seem that a compromise position is available: adulthood could be attributed automatically above a particular age (whether 16, 18 or 21), but that children below that age could sue for adulthood upon demonstrating exceptional competence. We consider a version of this proposal in section 5 below, but it is important that by itself it remains trapped within the dilemma of demarcation, since from the perspective of critics of age-based criteria, it is question-begging to assume an across-theboard exemption from scrutiny (as to whether one is competent) on the basis of age; in the absence of a legitimate reason for doing so, this amounts to arbitrary unequal treatment.
set of practices and institutions, neither property nor adulthood exists (Schapiro 2003, 585 Schapiro describes the parallel shift from childhood to adulthood as the emergence of a kind of constitution, a state of being organized as a self-guiding agent around a core of commitments, principles, and perspectives. What children lack is their own perspective on their choices, a 'constitution' on the basis of which to adjudicate between conflicting inclinations or impulses: 'Thus the condition of childhood is one in which the agent is not yet in a position to speak in her own voice because there is no voice which counts as hers' (Schapiro 1999 (Schapiro , 729, 2003 . 13 Crucial to Schapiro's account is that, as with the transition from the state of nature to civil society, the emergence of a perspective or voice is not a matter of having a little more voice or perspective, since a point of view is something one has 13 Schapiro's general line of argument is not completely new. Earlier Geoffrey Scarre argued that paternalism towards children is legitimate since they lack 'the ability to plan systematic policies of action' (Scarre 1980, 123) . Also more recently Robert Noggle suggested that while children sometimes have the capacity for 'simple agency,' they lack 'fully stable moral selves' (Noggle 2002, 100-101) ; also (Noggle and Brennan 1997) . In this sense, even a high level of competence in practical reason, self-understanding, and critical reflection is not sufficient for being an adult, because only selfconstitution is.
The other part of Schapiro's account here is that as with other forms of rehearsal and pretend-play, children learn a great deal from the increasingly serious rehearsal of activities such as expressing a perspective or deliberating about significant choices.
Playing is a form of experimentation which allows the child to take upon it different roles and positions, so as to build up experiences about the world and one's place in it. There is a kind of bootstrapping going on, according to Schapiro, by which children prepare themselves for adulthood by rehearsing for the point at which they step onto a different stage and play the role of adults. Her discussion suggests, in
particular, that what is distinctive of childhood is that the social world within which children play and rehearse is oriented toward that role -and that means that there is 14 We here follow her 2003 article. In the 1999 article, Shapiro had given a different account. There she argued that children gradually acquire authority over different 'domains of discretion'. In some areas, we allow them to act according to their own wishes while in other areas we are more reluctant to grant them this kind of authority. As children grow older, the number of domains in which they achieve discretion grows until finally all domains are under their control (Schapiro 1999, 733-734) . We agree with Schapiro that the new, 2003 model fits better with her overall theory. The 1999 position was mistaken in suggesting that decisions to grant discretion in particular domains relied on the basis of 'local attributability arguments'. The competent child should not be seen as acting as 'herself' in any domain, however well she acts.
room for experimentation and a gradual expansion of challenges, but that children are not held responsible to the same extent as adults, and above all that there is supervision. Without these elements in place, the behavior of children no longer is that of play and rehearsal, but rather hit-or-miss attempts at doing what adults do -or mere attempts to survive. Indeed, in such cases we tend to speak of individuals being 'denied a childhood.'
Now where does all of this leave us with respect to our central issue in this paper, the demarcation dilemma? On the one hand, we think Schapiro's account is very helpful in making the shift from technical competencies (proficiency) to the global status of childhood. On the other hand, however, she hasn't yet developed the arguments to ward off a threatening 'second demarcation dilemma,' in which a pragmatic case for age limits yet again stands opposed to a moral case for competence tests -only this time the object of the dilemma is autonomy development itself, not any set of technical competences. Schapiro herself is surprisingly silent on this issue.
Self-constitution marks the transition, and it involves self-constitution being attributed to someone. But it remains unclear whether this status is attributed on the basis of age or not. As long as this issue remains unresolved, Schapiro's account cannot be applied to a cased like Laura Dekker's.
The claim that self-constitution is what is constitutive of adulthood might suggest that Schapiro is actually defending a competence-based criterion for demarcating childhood from adulthood. And, indeed, some of her formulations suggest that she sees self-constitution as sufficient for adulthood. But if we view selfconstitution -understood as comprising the ability to assess matters critically from an integrated point of view -as the sufficient criterion for adulthood at any age, then we are back to the difficulties faced by competence-based view, discussed in the previous section. This would, however, entail that 9-year-olds who precociously develop mature decision-making skills and a distinctive point of view would no longer be children -and would put Schapiro squarely in the camp of the child-liberationists. This is not only against her stated aim (to refute child-liberationism), but also morally unattractive. On the other hand, if we stipulate a specific age as the point at which self-constitution is attributed to individuals, we seem to licensing treatment of individuals on the basis of a morally irrelevant category and, furthermore, ignoring the fact that self-constitution does involve capacities that some will not have yet developed at that age and others will have already long had. Laura Dekker, for is that the seller no longer has any claims to the use of the car and that the car is now the personal property of the buyer. But, in many countries at least, the sale is embedded in a further set of relations and institutions. The sale thus also transfers obligations to pay vehicular taxes, insure the car, and get regular safety or emissions inspections. At the same time, the seller retains responsibility for paying parking fines incurred before the sale. And so on. These facts are rarely specified explicitly in the terms of sale but are rather part of the relevant 'regime of vehicular property,'
comprising the laws, regulations, and customs that set the terms of what is entailed by a car sale. This is what it means to become the owner of a car, and it is not up to the buyers and sellers to change this regime. Different jurisdictions may decide to arrange things differently, but the justification for any particular regime will have to be in terms of the regime as a whole. Just as the meaning of a change in status is fixed by the wider framework, the justification will also be similarly systematic.
A regime of childhood comprises an even more complex network of relations, governing the status change from childhood to adulthood. Here we want to focus on four distinctive, interlocking aspects of the specifically 'modern regime of childhood':
an orientation towards autonomy development, limited liability for children, parental supervisory responsibilities and age-based demarcation. 16 What is ultimately at issue in the Dekker case (and others like it) is whether this regime of childhood is coherent and preferable, in particular, to one in which adulthood demarcated less on the basis of age and more on the basis of competence. Our position is that the current regime is less vulnerable to competence-based challenges than defenders of Dekker's claim have suggested. In elaborating this position, we describe here a vision of how the first three aspects can be seen as fitting together and then turn, in the next section, to focusing in on the fourth aspect; the specific issue of how to handle the diverse ways in which the precocious development of competence might be viewed as grounds for being exempted from age-based limits on decision-making authority.
First, the guiding purpose of the modern regime of childhood is a commitment to autonomy, not as the criterion for a normative status but as a set of capacities that are important for adult life and that require a period of development. The current regime of childhood is thus by its nature geared toward promoting and making possible a developmental process. This gives it the paternalistic and 'perfectionist' character that so irritates many liberals (Scarre 1980, 117) . But surely if there is anything that a regime of childhood should be about, it is the enablement of a process of maturation. We take it that Schapiro's articles have sufficiently established this point. We will here take the paramount importance of autonomy as given, and not defend this guiding purpose against other (say, pre-modern) regimes of childhood in which autonomy didn't play such a fundamental role (e.g. in which adulthood is connected to the maturation of other capacities as central). A full defense of the modern regime would of course require such a comparative investigation of the value of autonomy. We also omit a discussion of which skills precisely are necessary for being an autonomous adult in a given society, and what level of development is necessary for decision-making authority and full responsibility. For example, as societies become more complex and require more complex autonomy-capacities, this may very well require a longer trajectory of development, and therefore a higher age of majority, at least relative to less complex societies.
17 Second, the current regime circumscribes the responsibilities of children.
Minors are not fully accountable for their actions, given that they are not fully their own. Although this accountability increases with age, the ultimate responsibility is never entirely with them. As Schapiro's discussion of 'play' suggests, limited liability creates a protected space for the duration of childhood, in which there is room to experiment, explore, and practice with a safety net in place. The guiding intuition here is that autonomy development is facilitated by such a circumscribed period of experimentation. Although this would ultimately have to be supported by empirical research in developmental psychology, support can be found in the familiar idea that there are costs to moving too quickly to a more difficult and demanding level of activity. In the case of musical skills or sports skills, coaches and teachers are regularly cautioning against children doing exercises or activities that they are not yet ready for. Aside from possibilities of injury, the concern here is that once an athlete or a dancer or pianist has started to put all the different component parts of the performance together the individual moves to a different perspective on the performance, and any attempt to look at the component parts again will always be from that perspective. There is in this sense, then, no going back. The 'opportunity costs of premature advancement' involve a lost opportunity for a kind of development that occurs best (or perhaps exclusively) within the framework provided by a particular level of development. This is just one example of the general point that the having a period of being a novice can be functional for the development of certain abilities.
Third, the current regime of childhood can only facilitate modes of exploration by arranging for a period of tutelage, on the grounds that there are skills and dispositions required for autonomous adulthood that are best acquired as a novice and with a safety net in place. The justification of parental authority and responsibility fits in here, in that parental fiduciary duties are not merely arbitrary impositions of power but partly constitutive of the possibility of exploration, rehearsal, and play as such, since this involves supervision being in place so that the full responsibility regarding things going wrong does not have to lie with the child. Parents are responsible not just for giving a child the possibility to act upon her own decisions as she gradually becomes capable of doing so. They are also responsible for protecting the interests of the adult that the child is to become. Harry Brighouse has usefully drawn a fourfold distinction between immediate and future welfare interests and immediate and future agency interests (Brighouse 2003, 701) . 18 Parents have to take all of these interests into account.
With these three elements of the modern regime of childhood in the picture, 
Emancipation
Any regime of childhood should be explicit about how it deals with children's gradual acquisition of competences, both more technical and autonomy-related competences.
To what extent should children be allowed to act upon their growing competencies and thus be emancipated from their childhood status? In this section we propose a way of answering this question in terms of a distinction between local emancipation and global emancipation. 'Local emancipation' will refer to specific exemptions to age-based status-ascriptions while still remaining under tutelage more generally, while 'global emancipation' will refer to exemptions whereby those below the age of majority are no longer under tutelage at all (although they may not automatically acquire all rights typically accorded to adults, just as U.S. laws prohibit adults under the age of 21 from purchasing alcohol).
Local emancipation serves to accommodate precocious children who have reached certain technical competencies early on in specific domains. Thus, for example, a regime of childhood might allow for numerous procedures by which minors can appeal for exemptions from default age thresholds, and differing degrees of responsibility and decision-making authority might be accorded differently across different domains of activity. Commercial and occupational choices for example might be treated differently from choices in medical contexts, and experimentation with hobbies and sports might be treated differently from experiments with drugs or alcohol. In some cases, for example, liability or responsibility for foolish or harmful actions might be shared between children and guardians, and to varying degrees.
Local emancipation allows for these competence-based exceptions. Making these arrangements, in which children gradually take on responsibility and 'suffer the consequences' of poor choices are necessary for autonomy development to be effective. But, as we saw, the very idea of childhood as a separate status presupposes that parents keep the final responsibility for the overall process of their children's development. The buck stops with them.
handles global emancipation. 20 In such cases, global emancipation is not view as a good thing per se, but as part of the best solution to a difficult situation (call this 'exceptional global emancipation'). A second approach is to make global emancipation into a straightforward, elective option for qualified children. A regime that takes this approach effectively abolishes the age of majority and endorses an ageneutral, competence-based approach to demarcation. Most likely this would involve retaining a default age of majority but permitting some children to apply for an assessment of their level of maturity and autonomy. In a regime of childhood that permitted this 'elective global emancipation,' no appeal would need to be made to exceptional circumstances relating to familial hardship. Allowing for the option of suing for adulthood would not abolish the status-distinction between children and adults altogether. Everyone still first goes through a phase of childhood, and then reaches adulthood. But the moment of transition would be radically transformed into a competence-based, age-neutral approach.
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Our position is that it is this elective global emancipation that is problematic, and that both local emancipation and exceptional global emancipation can be more easily defended. In defending this, we must explain, in particular, why we oppose giving children who meet the minimal requirements for autonomy the corresponding decision-making authority. If we are willing to endorse exemptions from age restrictions in specific domains and on grounds of technical competence, why not allow it for the form of restriction that ultimately matters most, childhood tutelage itself? Of course, the kinds of pragmatic considerations mentioned in section 2 -administrative costs and dangers of biases in testing -play a role here as well.
Elective global emancipation would be an addition to the current legal system and so raise administrative costs. The biases when judging autonomy development are, if anything, likely to be much more severe than when testing competencies for relatively restricted sets of activities (like driving). As we mentioned in section 2, the courts' treatment of Dekker's developmental opportunities was much more contentious than her sailing competencies. However, these pragmatic considerations alone do not provide a knock-down argument against elective global emancipation and therefore still keep us trapped in the second (higher-level) demarcation dilemma.
Within the context of a regime of childhood, we are now in a position to supplement these pragmatic considerations with inherently relational considerations.
We have to see whether allowing some children to leave the childhood phase earlier than others undermines the beneficial effects that the regime is to have on all children.
We think there are three good regime-specific reasons to be critical of elective emancipation.
A first reason is the need for stable expectations with respect to the parentchild relationship. A regime needs to give parents feasible structures to perform the responsibilities attributed to them as part of the regime. For example, it is plausible that a strongly competence-based approach to demarcating childhood and adulthood would undermine the ability of parents to carry out their responsibilities effectively (thereby jeopardizing the long-term autonomy interests of the children involved). This is because, at least in many societies we are familiar with, having the child's status a constant focus of negotiation and renegotiation creates uncertainties and unclarities that put counterproductive strains on parent-child relationships. If this is right, one of the advantages of age-based criteria, with publicly recognized rites of passage at particular ages, is that it introduces much-needed, stabilizing points of reference into the complex process in which parents navigate with their teenage children the transition to adulthood, as in, 'When you're 18, you can decide that for yourself, but not yet.'
A second reason for not allowing global emancipation is that it will tend to undermine healthy in-group relations between children. Compare this to the discussion about mandatory health insurance. In many countries, the state requires non-indigent individuals to purchase health insurance, because that enables the state to pool many different risks, so that health coverage can be extended to all at a moderate price. If 'good risks' (those with good health expectations) are allowed to exit the collective pool and insure themselves, this will be advantageous to them. The 'bad risks' that remain behind will however face a much higher price, given their higher on average health care costs. 22 A similar argument can be made against the elective emancipatory regime. If most children would turn out not be interested in early emancipation, then there wouldn't be any consequences for the regime (in the same way that the collective health pool wouldn't suffer much if only a handful of people would exit). 23 But if many would try to exit, this would arguably create a schism between children, who are often intensively interacting with their peers. Some would feel losers, because they haven't gone up for the adult-test (or even worse, failed it). Others would feel stress for trying to meet the test, etc. This would put relations between children under severe strains. And it would transform childhood into a period marked off by failing to perform well enough.
A third reason has to do with inequality between children. In an elective emancipatory regime it might well be children from stable and fortunate family backgrounds who will apply earliest and most successfully to opt out. If this happened, it would likely exacerbate existing inequalities of power, wealth, and social status. Although it is difficult to foresee the practical consequences of such a generalized practice of differentiation in seeking adulthood status, it would be surprising if the sphere-transgressing influence of money would here not come to play a role as it has in so many other spheres of life (Walzer 1983 ).
Before continuing, we would like to address two potential objections. The first is that we are exaggerating the problems with permitting elective global emancipation, on the grounds that the number of cases of global emancipation will be vanishingly small.
Suppose we grant there would be no point in prohibiting global emancipation if it only occurred in extremely rare circumstances. Are there reasons to assume that it will be rare? There are two scenarios here: the level of global emancipation might be low because few children request it, or it could be low because most requests for emancipation would be denied on the merits. Take the first case. If the criteria are set at a relatively relaxed level, such that 10% of 12-year-old children qualify, it might still be thought that few would actually take advantage of this before the age of 16 or 18. But it strikes us as very risky policy-making to permit, on the basis of assumptions about whether people are inclined to take advantage of the option, something that would be problematic if pursued widely. These trends can change, and trying to roll back these permissions would be politically difficult. Alternatively, it might be thought that few children would qualify, even if they wanted to. Indeed, a regime of childhood could ensure that by setting the bar for qualifying very high. But suppose it then turned out, as we think likely, that the only way to keep the number of qualifying 15-or 16-year-olds to low levels would be to require that aspirant adults demonstrate exceptionally well-developed skills in self-discipline, rational planning, emotional maturity, and so on. If so, then we are back to the objections raised earlier by critics of age-based approaches to demarcating childhood. Not only are young persons required to meet a higher standard for full-fledged adulthood, it is also the case that defining full-fledged adulthood in such demanding terms would also put pressure on the touchstone liberal assumption that individuals above the age of 18 (or 21) ought to count, by default, as genuine adults. This is not to deny that there are also important practical advantages to a clear line of demarcation. As we acknowledged in section 2, it is often appropriate to rely on a notion of the 'standard person' (Feinberg 1986) in order to avoid unnecessarily taking on administrative and juridical responsibilities that drain public coffers, overburden the legitimacy of the courts, or expose individuals to the risk of biased treatment. Thus, the courts and legislatures could just say that the 'standard 15-yearold' is ill-prepared for global emancipation and leave it at that. Our point is that focusing only on administrative reasons leaves fails to take seriously both the strongly held objections of teens such as Dekker and the real importance of childhood as a context for autonomy development.
Having now formulated a principled set of objections to elective global emancipation, on the basis of a reconceptualization of the demarcation dilemma in terms of regimes of childhood, we now finally return to the Dekker case.
Sailing Alone?
Although we do not aim to resolve the question of whether Laura Dekker ought to have been allowed to sail or not, in this section we will point to relevant features of the case that would need to be decided in order to answer that question. As we will argue, what is intriguing about Dekker's case is that part of what has been in dispute is whether allowing her to sail alone constitutes local or global emancipation, as we are using those terms. Our position is that if she (together with her father) was suing for merely local emancipation, that would have been less problematic, but in that case, provisions would have to have been made for the father being able to carry out his supervisory duties; otherwise, we have a situation of de facto global emancipation.
Above, we argued that an essential component of any regime of childhood is the suspension of full responsibility. One way to bring this out is by imagining the public response to news that Dekker had drowned as compared with the news that someone twice her age, undertaking the same feat, had drowned. In the case of adults, we would view it as a tragic loss, but perhaps also partly as the results of foolishness on the part of the adult sailor. In the case of a young teen, such as Dekker, we suspect that any doubts about the judgments involved would be directed not at the child but at her parents. And, for the reasons discussed earlier, this is entirely appropriate. Alternatively, Mr. Dekker might actually understand himself to be still exercising his parental responsibilities by adequately and appropriately supervising his daughter, albeit at a distance. This is, in our opinion, the more fruitful route.
Dekker's case has to be interpreted as one of local emancipation. What does this mean for judging the permissibility of her journey?
First, this means the courts cannot avoid saying something about the scope of the responsibility that parents have to exercise. Using the fourfold distinction introduced by Brighouse (see section 4 above), Dekker will normally enjoy her trip (she has an immediate welfare interest in it) and the trip will if all goes well train several parts of her agency (immediate agency interest). However, it remains to be 24 We see no reason to doubt that the impetus and driving force behind the plan to sail around the world lay with Laura Dekker and not her father, although this may well play a decisive role in analyzing other cases, such as those of child performers. Here, it is the daughter who is seeking (some form of) emancipation. Note that a potentially complicating factor that we bracket is the opposition of Laura's mother, from whom she was estranged. Of course, since we do not have full access to the court documents, we cannot here make any adjudication of what Mr. Dekker's actual motives, intentions, or judgments are in the case. We focus instead on the implication of possible scenarios.
seen whether the trip will also serve the person she is later going to be, both in terms of agency and welfare. It might just as well thwart her future agency (e.g. if she will be disabled because of an accident) or her future welfare (e.g. if she later regrets not having spent her teenage years among peers). The court treats these kinds of future interests in terms of Dekker's social, emotional and identity development. As mentioned in section 1, a proper assessment of these turned out to be impossible due to a lack of cooperation on the part of Dekker and her family. However, on our account such an assessment is imperative and the court would have to be judged too permissive in its waiving of this assessment.
Second, children's development of autonomy requires parental supervision.
The parent needs to be able to intervene if it judges the child to be insufficiently competent in making decisions or carrying out specific plans. Whether this requires a more or less continuous monitoring of children by their parents, clearly will depend heavily on circumstances: the precise details of the planned journey Dekker is undertaking, the technological resources that are available for monitoring at distance, and so on. We are not in position to judge whether or not the relevant criteria are met in this specific case, and so our main point here is simply that this is the kind of consideration that ought to have been central in the courts deliberations about this case. Note that this is a different point from the one on which the court deliberations focused, i.e. Dekker's technical competences. The point about supervision is not merely a point about safety. Rather it is an issue of whether or not the supervisory responsibilities constitutive of parenthood can be exercised under the circumstances of a solo circumnavigation. Childhood requires guardians, whose role is oftenparticularly in adolescence -one of a safety-net, background monitor, and 'sleeper'
supervisor, who swings into action as needed. But to fulfill this role, there needs to be not only enough communication, but also an ongoing relationship that provides a supportive context for intervening in a constructive way.
Of course, the supervisory responsibilities of parents do change as the child approaches the age of majority, and this means that parents must judge the extent to which their children are able to handle new responsibilities, even if the children never have ultimate responsibility. So it might not be problematic that Dekker receives a lot of decision-making responsibility on her journey, if she turns out to have developed her personality to such an extent that she can independently handle a great variety of unexpected situations. However, one might still worry that the waiver from actual supervision that Dekker gets from her father is so generic and across-the-board that she seems to gain something like decision-making authority on her trip -just the thing that distinguishes global emancipation from local emancipation. Whether this is the case is something that the courts need to decide. If Dekker´s sailing plan turns out to exclude global emancipation in words only, but in effect would be a case of global emancipation under the guise of local emancipation, then the courts would have reason to prohibit her plans.
Conclusion
In this paper we have taken the Dekker case as a point of departure for thinking about the legal, moral and political status of childhood. We have shown how the debate about the Dekker case deadlocked by being framed in terms of the dilemma 'age versus competence'. We have argued that we should move beyond this dilemma by reconceptualizing the distinction between childhood and adulthood as one of status.
This opens up a more fruitful -though decidedly more complicated -debate over various ways of arranging and institutionalizing a 'regime of childhood'. The issue of emancipation is one important part of the specific regime of childhood of modern western societies, which exhibit a lot of emphasis on the idea of growing into an autonomous person. The usefulness of thinking of childhood as a normative status accorded within a regime extends beyond the issue of emancipation, though. We think that these notions can help us think about other controversial issues surrounding childhood, and be extended to analyze arguments in other controversial court cases in this area. 25 
